Notwithstanding its maturity, the literature on European Union 
INTRODUCTION
The European Commission's strategy to create a single European railway market has followed a long-lasting policy sequence. By fostering competition within domestic passenger markets by 2020, the 2013 Commission's proposal sets the final step towards complete liberalization, which has required three decades and four packages of regulatory reform. The previous experience in other network markets, in particular electricity, telecommunications and airlines, has defined the principles and elements of an open and competitive economic governance of railways (Dyrhauge 2013) . The railway network of the European Union (EU) has been designed to be 'independent of national governments, with a transparent governance framework and nondiscriminatory rules' (Dyrhauge 2013: 72) . In April 2016, the technical pillar of the fourth reform package was adopted and, as a result, the European Union Agency for Railway (ERA) will play a greater role in ensuring the implementation and convergence towards the EU model of a fully open railway market.
The implementation of EU regulatory reform is complex. Policy actor preferences are dispersed among levels of governance, and EU decision-making is specialised by sectors and policies (Vollaard and Sindbjerg Martinsen 2014) . Reform objectives are often ambiguous, allowing sufficient discretion to member states for them to delay (Kaeding 2006) and relax the legal transposition (Zhelyazkova 2013) as well as the technical harmonization (Versluis 2007 ) of EU single-market directives. As a result, national governments' efforts to comply with the successive steps of liberalisation towards the market opening should not be taken for granted. Indeed, several scholars have shown that the legal transposition of the EU rail policy at the national level has been uneven Kaeding 2006) . Beyond the legal transposition, new entrants have faced many obstacles in accessing national rail markets because of the dominant position of incumbent companies (Dyrhauge 2013: 72) .
This article focuses on administrative practices necessary for the actual implementation of and the compliance with EU rail policy. In order to analyse the variation in the enforcement and monitoring of market operators (Falkner et al. 2005 : 12, Treib 2008 , the extent of access to rail markets is measured from the perspective of a new entrant in national markets (see section 4.1 for a detailed illustration of the dependent variable).
Although EU compliance studies revolve around well defined theoretical arguments for explaining variation in compliance with EU legislation, the 'law in action' (Versluis 2007 ) and the implementation stages beyond the punctual and correct legal transposition of regulation have generally been overlooked (Mastenbroek 2005; Treib 2008 ). This is because it is often difficult to generate reliable and representative data on technical harmonization and enforcement of EU legislation at the national level.
Accordingly, time-series cross-sectional analyses tend to rely on the Commission's official statistics on notifications and infringements and, consequently, to focus on the timeliness or the correctness of transposition (Hartlapp and Falkner 2009 ).
EU compliance analyses are a relevant part of Europeanization studies (Saurugger 2015) . Following Börzel and Risse (2000: 3), we conceptualize Europeanization as 'a process of institution-building at the European level' that 'impacts upon the member states' by inducing substantial policy change, and ultimately policy convergence, if the researcher is able to observe among EU member states an increased similarity over time (Holzinger 2006 , Kahn-Nisser 2015 , Paezold and Van Vliet 2014 .
Building on Plümper and Schneider's (β009) national IRAs' capacity of obtaining information on and monitoring the access to railway markets depends on complaints for discriminatory practices, this convergence process is enhanced by the presence of railway companies that exhort the enforcement of railway liberalization. These findings are consistent with previous literature that shows the positive impact of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) on the implementation of EU rail liberalization (Nash 2008; Versluis and Tarr 2013) . By highlighting the role of IRAs on railway policy convergence, this paper also contributes to an emerging literature on the impact of agentification on EU compliance (García Quesada 2014), the adoption of standards (Maggetti and Gilardi 2011) , and the quality of regulatory governance (Guidi 2015; Vining, Laurin and Weimer 2015) .
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Focusing on vertical separation and independence of national regulators, the next section summarises the evolution of EU railway regulatory reform and highlights the ongoing process of convergence.
Section 3 disentangles the causal factors driving convergence towards the EU economic railway governance model. Section 4 describes the data and the convergence models.
Section 5 summarises the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes by providing recommendation for regulatory reform and arguing that EU compliance studies should analyse specific policy sectors, rather than aggregate and cross-policy sectors.
EU RAILWAY REFORM AND THE INCOMPLETE PROCESS OF CONVERGE
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the EU has been establishing a regulatory framework for a standardised competitive managed market within a single railway area. The aims of the EU's step-by-step regulatory reform and support-building strategy have been to increase the competitiveness of the rail transport system, and to foster a pattern of sustainable mobility. delegates several functions to the state-owned incumbent (Dyrhauge 2013: 46-47; Nash 2008: 63; OECD 2013: 24) .
Once established the principles of infrastructure managers' independence, the EU has pursued a gradual opening to competition and a progressive harmonization of technical and safety standards and administrative processes in order to increase the interoperability of national rail systems. Focusing on the rail freight, the first package of reform was enacted in 2001 and defined a trans-European rail freight network. To achieve a level playing field for new entrants, this package required the independence of the national authority responsible for the licensing process from the incumbent rail operator. In 2004, the second railway package increased the administrative transparency by furthering the specifications of freight railway interoperability and common safety standards, and by creating the European Railway Agency (ERA).
Beside vertical separation, the establishment of a European transnational network of regulatory agencies (comprised of the European agency, national enforcement agencies for ensuring interoperability and access to rail markets, as well as national railway safety authorities) is the other institutional innovation to reform the governance of national railways. The main function of the network of national rail agencies is to 'monitor implementation at the domestic level' (Versluis and Tarr 2013: 316) . National regulatory agencies that are independent from both the incumbent rail company and from the political control can better ensure actual compliance at the national level with the full competition model designed in Brussels. In not vertically separated systems, 'railway regulator is in conflict with the incumbents and its main role is to support new entrants in case they feel discriminated against' (Finger and Messulam 2015: 16) .
The existence of a politically independent regulatory agency is not, though, a result of the transposition process: 'Directive β001/14 specifically permits the regulatory function to be located within the Ministry, provided that it is independent from any "infrastructure manager, charging body, allocation body or applicant". Thus independence from political control is not required' (Nash 2008: 65) . IRAs are however not operating in an economic-political void. Therefore the presence of new entrants in national markets, the extent of institutional veto players and the density of trade unions are the other variables to take into account in order to explain convergence. The following subsections illustrate each of these determinants of convergence, arguing that the institutional and economic governance accounts need to be integrated in order to explain the convergence of railway reform among the EU-15.
The conditional effect of national regulatory agencies
Although the implementation of EU legislation lies with the member states, networks of national IRAs can be the solution to the lack of regulatory harmonization in a multilevel context (Hobolth and Sindbjerg Martinsen 2013; Jensen 2007) . Within the transgovernmental network concerning the EU rail area, the ERA has the potential to play several roles in order to enhance compliance (Versluis and Tarr 2013) . From the enforcement perspective, the ERA examines the transposition of several directives and has carried out cross-auditing pilots (Versluis and Tarr 2013) . However, unlike other transport agencies it has no competence to inspect national authorities (Groenleer, Kaeding and Versluis 2010; Versluis and Tarr 2013: 324) . From the perspective of administrative capacity, the ERA can facilitate strategies of administrative capacity building across national regulatory authorities by explaining and training on interoperability and safety standards. Finally, by exchanging best practices and disseminating information, the ERA can be perceived as a teacher of norms (Versluis and Tarr 2013) . Accordingly, we expect the ERA and its network of national agencies to influence the speed of adjustment and the degree of policy change of member states.
However, these roles can be played by the ERA only if national agencies are in place.
Only national and independent agencies can effectively ensure the fulfilment of liberalization objectives through the progressive implementation and enforcement of measures designed to ensure competitiveness and openness in national rail markets. In other words, because the function of IRAs is to depoliticise decision-making concerning the governance of utility markets (Majone 1994) , independence from the incumbent operator and from political control is crucial for achieving the goals of the regulatory reform promoted by the EU but implemented at the national level (Thatcher 2002) . Accordingly, an IRA tends to guarantee non-discriminatory market access for new entrants and to enhance the transparency of decisions concerning rail operator licences and safety standards. It also regulates infrastructure allocation procedures, supervises access fee costs, oversees disputes concerning train path allocations, and monitors the extent competition (Finger and Messulam 2015, IBM 2011) .
Convergence towards the EU model requires that national rail markets be constantly adjusted to eventually meet the requirements of the EU reform packages. The political institutional capacity for regulatory reform depends on the institutional arrangements and is a moderating factor that partly explains the variation in countries' responses to Europeanisation (Schmidt 2002: 898) . As regulatory enforcers, national IRAs are the institutions responsible for ensuring the actual implementation of EU regulatory reform, and so play an essential role in de facto administrative operations and regulatory enforcement (García Quesada 2014).
The fit with railway economic governance and the role of veto players
The objective of EU railway reform is to increase the competitiveness of the railways.
A previous comparative qualitative analysis of the implementation of the first directive when the score of the ETCR "vertical integration" variable equals 0 (attested to ownership separation) or 3 (attested to legal separation), and value 0 in the case of accounting separation. Another dummy variable captures whether a country has chosen a full institutional separation (Nash 2008 and Dyrhauge 2013 , and see Section 2). We also include a dummy variable that equals 1 when a given country established an IRA.
With the exclusion of Ireland, the Online Appendix, available on the Taylor & Francis website, shows that there is a great variance in the timing of establishing a regulatory body independent from the political control.
By interacting these dummy variables with the lagged level of the dependent variable, we can assess the effect of vertical separation and regulatory agencies on the rate of convergence (see Equation 2 ). We also expect that IRA is the institutional solution that would allows countries with low level of access to catch up with the de facto compliance.
Rail market structure and veto players index
The constraining effect of the economic governance misfit has been taken into account by including another index of the ETCR dataset. Specifically, we rely on the 'Market Structure' score, which varies between 0 and 6 (the lower scores indicate a high level of competition among rail operators). This score is composed of two items, one concerning the number of operators that compete in the passenger transport market, and the other the freight transport market.
We also include in the model a veto player index, by using the revised version of Tsebelis's index proposed by Jahn et al. (2014) . This index comprises a time-variant veto player preference and includes information on institutional settings, such as a second chamber and a president of the executive, that are 'anticipate veto players'. variables, we opted to apply the robust standard error procedure to address correlated and non-identically distributed errors in the analysis (Huber 1967; Beck 2008) . [ Table 1 Integration under Grant 334008.
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1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting to focus on the key changes in economic governance structure. Focusing on one of the two market sectors would reduce by half the number of observations. 
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STATISTICAL MODELS
To assess the extent of catching-up convergence, we rely on the following, basic model, equation:
(1)
where yi,t is the change in the degree of liberalization in the rail market of country i.
The coefficient of the variable yi,t-1 , i.e. the country's level of rail market access in the previous period of observation, represents the speed of adjustment. A negative and significant value of this coefficient implies convergence towards the EU model of railway governance. Given the limited number of observations, we included only few control variables: market structure, the number of institutional veto players and the density of trade unions. Accordingly, k is the coefficient of xi,t, i.e. the vector of the variables associated with rail market structure, veto players and trade union density; and i,t is an error process assumed be independent and identically distributed.
To estimate the effect of vertical separation and the establishment of IRAs on the speed of adjustment (across the EU-15) towards the EU rail liberalization model, we rely on the following:
